

The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XX

New York, Wednesday, September 17, 1919

Number 254

Contents

The Week	184
Leading Editorials	
Pershing	186
Establishing a Precedent	186
Coming Home to Roost	188
Wilson on Russia	189
Light from the Lawyers	190
A Good Chance to Start Right	191
On the Door Step	191
Production and Cost of Living	192
General Articles	
For a Department of State	Walter Lippmann 194
Schools	James Weber Linn 197
The Critic and the Criticized	Francis Hackett 198
General Smuts: Statesman	200
The Value of Japanese Promises	James Thayer Addison 202
A Communication	206
Correspondence	207
Reviews of Books	
Prophecy and Authority	K. L. 208
Ludwig Lewisohn's Criticism	Rebecca West 208
A Not Impossible Religion	A. W. V. 210
Cheero	211
Mummery	211
The Disabled Soldier	Kathleen Goldsmith 211

The Week

IT is not likely that the Democratic Senators who have come around to advocacy of amendments were led to this step by a feeling that Mr. Wilson's tour was a failure. But had his trip shown any marks of a triumph these Senators would scarcely have come out so boldly against the policy of ratification which they have always been supposed to favor. The bolt of Mr. Shields, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Hoke Smith makes some amendment of the treaty almost certain. For Republicans of the "mild reservation" group, like Mr. Kenyon and Mr. Capper, have also announced themselves substantially satisfied with the program of reservations drawn by the Committee on Foreign Relations. Perhaps it is Mr. Wilson's failure to call a halt on Allied support of reactionary movements in Hungary, Russia, Poland and other lands that is most responsible for a growing belief in the Senate, still vague, that a League to enforce the present treaty may prove only another Holy Alliance,

AUSTRIA was certain to accept any peace treaty the Allies chose to give her. For a while her statesmen might

plead injustice but in the end there was nothing for them except surrender. Of the terms which the Austrian Assembly has now accepted we have not had a full report. But the summary of the treaty shows that it hands over many hundreds of thousands of German-Austrians to alien states, particularly of Czechoslovakia, and that it follows a dangerous precedent set in the Germany treaty by fixing an indefinite figure for Austria's indemnity. Against a union of Austria and Germany French influence has from the first been active. And there has accordingly been written into the new treaty a specific provision against the much advertised doctrine of self-determination.

THE Allied reply to Austria furnishes one particularly good instance of how a principle can be made to cut two ways. "As regards the Tyrol," says the Peace Conference note, "the Allied and Associated powers have been impressed by the fact that for decades the Italian people have suffered from a menace deliberately placed at their heart by the retention in Austro-Hungarian hands of military outposts commanding the Italian plains." Strategic frontiers, says the Conference, are of vital importance. And accordingly Italy is given the line "she has long demanded."

BUT in the paragraph immediately following—refusing Austria's demand for strategic frontiers of her own—the Peace Conference note declares "The Allied and Associated powers would further remind the Austrian delegation that the treaty of peace makes special provisions for the protection of small communities, such as new Austria. It will no longer be possible for powerful empires to threaten with impunity the political and economic life of their lesser neighbors." In other words, it is only the powerful empires that need strategic frontiers—and they are to have them. The little states, where strategic frontiers would presumably be pardonable, are to be satisfied with the guarantee of a League of Nations upon which the larger Powers feel it unsafe to rely.

RUMANIA has a ready answer to the ultimatum of the Peace Conference. If the Allies insist that she stop her plundering in Hungary and take her troops home, Rumania "may be obliged to consider the advantages of withdrawing her troops across the Dvina, in southern Rus-

sia, and declining all responsibility for the chaos to which that part of Europe may be reduced by the dissensions of the Bolsheviks, royalists and reactionaries." That is, Rumania threatens to drop out of the anti-Bolshevik crusade unless she is to be recompensed by the privilege of despoiling Hungary at her pleasure. To the diplomats in Paris this may look like blackmail. But why, after all, is it not a perfectly sound answer? Rumania wants to know why it is wrong for her to send troops into Hungary if it is right for England, France and America to send troops into Russia. Are the little victors not to share with the great ones the privilege of intervention?

DEbate in the French Chamber shows that there are some Deputies who do not think France gets as much from the peace treaty as England and Japan. What is most interesting to Americans in this discussion is the argument used by government spokesmen to convert their critics to ratification. We have only fragmentary accounts of the debate; but M. Tardieu and his colleagues seem to be banking heavily on the proposed Anglo-Franco-American Alliance. Reports of their speeches do not indicate that they regard this treaty as something entirely temporary—an impression held by Mr. Wilson. It is rather to be the foundation stone of French diplomacy on the Continent. Inasmuch as the alliance itself contains no clause setting a date of termination, the least that the Senate can do before taking action on a treaty so subversive of American tradition and the principles of a world League is to secure from England and France a statement of the period for which they believe the alliance is to remain operative.

APPARENTLY the treaty with Bulgaria is to be completed without any settlement for the quarrel in Thrace. Mr. Wilson's proposals seem to have been rejected. They did not give enough to Greece. And Greece, being on the winning side, saw no reason why the principle that gave Shantung to Japan and the Saar mines to France should not be carried into the Balkans. With no decision reached in Thrace, with Rumania and Serbia quarrelling for the Banat, Montenegro on the edge of revolution, and Albania protesting against the spoliation of her territory, the Balkans have a peace that is not far from war. It was never an easy task to draw boundary lines in southeastern Europe. Delay, and the example of spoils-seeking set by the larger states, have now put a peaceful solution of Balkan questions farther off than ever.

THE most important issue before the British Trade Union Congress now in session is the question of political action versus the direct method of the strike. When Mr. Lloyd George rejected the Sankey report for nationalization of the coal-mines he threw down a plain challenge to the trade unions. The miners have already refused the program offered by the government in place of nationalization. But what weapon they will use to force government ownership will be largely determined by debate in the present conference. Resort to direct action to achieve a political aim is a policy urged by those who consider that control of publicity by the government and the conservative press makes political action an unreality. But Mr.

Henderson advises British labor to conceive itself in power, and then to contemplate the use by its opponents of methods that are unconstitutional.

ALLIED activity in Archangel is summed up in a remarkable statement issued by Lt.-Col. Sherwood Kelly, commander of the 2d Battalion of the Hampshire Regiment (British Expeditionary Forces). Colonel Kelly declares that he volunteered for service in Russia "in the sincere belief that this was needed to make possible the withdrawal of British troops," but that "immediately after our arrival in Archangel we received the impression that the policy of our officials was not what it was stated to be. . . . We discovered that the much vaunted 'loyal Russian army' was composed largely of Bolshevik prisoners dressed in khaki, utterly unreliable and always constituting a greater menace to our troops than the Bolshevik army opposing them. This was tragically demonstrated when the Russians mutinied and murdered their British officers."

IT is unfortunate that Senator McCormick has so drawn his resolution for the recall of American troops that it applies both to Siberia and to Europe. To be sure, those soldiers who are to remain in Germany are too few to be of great practical service; they are there, not as a symbol of the League of Nations, but as an assurance to the French that America will remain interested in the attempted enforcement of an unworkable treaty. Nevertheless it is a misfortune that in Mr. McCormick's resolution these men are coupled with the troops in Siberia. For every argument in support of the resolution can now be easily twisted. Those who defend the use of American troops in Russia will base their opposition to Mr. McCormick's proposal on the ground that it would be a betrayal of Foch and the French army on the Rhine.

WITH Mr. McCormick's demand that our troops be brought home from Siberia all American liberals will be in sympathy. The official assumption upon which these troops are being detained is that they are keeping the railways open for the Red Cross and other relief organizations. But they are also keeping the roads open for Japanese troops and American munitions that are to be used in a cause to which the United States has given neither its legal nor moral support. The argument that we must aid the work of the Red Cross would stand on sounder ground if simultaneously we should put a ban on Japanese troops and American shells. So long as American troops remain in Siberia we are giving comfort to the enemies of Russian freedom who cluster in Tokio, Paris and Omsk.

ACTION by the American trade unions shows a growing hostility to the policy of Mr. Wilson's administration in Russia. In June the national convention of the American Federation of Labor was content with a half-way position. It dodged the issue of raising the blockade. But since June there has been a rising protest against the continuation of the blockade and the use of American troops in Siberia. Resolutions against this sort of intervention have been

adopted by many trade union bodies—among others, by the New York Federation of Labor, the Women's Trade Union League, the United Shoe Workers, and the Labor parties of New York and Chicago. Opposition to our present Russian policy will continue to grow with the postponement of a military decision and the gradual realization, by Americans, of the enormity of our responsibility for helping to kill non-combatants with an embargo.

AS we go to press it is uncertain what the results are to be of Mr. Wilson's promised intervention in the dispute between the Steel Corporation and the trade unions. The President agreed to try what the trade unions had failed to do: to get a hearing from Mr. Gary. Union leaders have informed Mr. Wilson that they do not know how long they can hold the rank and file in check. The prevention of meetings and the discharge of union members, they say, "have brought about such a situation that it is difficult to withhold or restrain the indignation of the men, and the resistance that they declare it is their purpose to present." In some quarters this warning will be regarded as a bluff. But the action of the California railwaymen and of the West Virginia miners—completely disregarding the edicts of their leaders—is a hint that the rank and file of labor is indeed the active force behind the various demands that the trade unions are now presenting.

Pershing

ONE of the men who was closest to Pershing throughout the war remarked recently that a republic had always to be afraid of being conquered by its conquering army, but that in Pershing, happily, the nation had found a soldier who wished only to be a soldier. His record in France is testimony to the truth of it. His instinct as to what was the true rôle of an American commander, whether in relation to his political chiefs, or to the French people, or the beaten enemy, was superb. He organized and commanded the A. E. F., cooperated with the Allies but maintained a useful independence, and acted with sincere understanding of the fact that the soldier executes but does not make high policy. He neither bragged nor truckled, and though he had to endure a fair amount of intrigue and jealousy, he emerges untarnished and impressive. He commanded not only well but in fine spirit. In all history there has probably never been a cleaner army, a more single-minded army, a less factional army, or considering its previous preparations, a more effective army. He did not alone make it what it was, to be sure, but because of him it was possible to make it what it was. The spirit which prevails at the top radiates through the whole military hierarchy. Judged by the results, and they alone count here, Pershing has proved himself fully competent for

the most delicate command ever entrusted to an American general. He succeeds in every essential part of his huge task.

It does not matter whether he originated or accepted the underlying policies on which the A. E. F. was organized. The policies finally adopted proved to be sound. The organization was conceived, as it ought to have been, on a larger scale than the occasion required. It was an organization that through all its infinite ramifications produced an ever-increasing and finally overwhelming supply of battle troops. The possibilities of fatal error were great. In all big matters they were avoided. Only an extraordinary grasp of what was important and a superb imagination can account for so successful a discrimination in the helter skelter of advice which was thrust upon him. There were to be sure minor failures at many points. Examination of them will show, we imagine, that they were due to one of two things—to a lack of intellectual preparation by the General Staff before America entered the war, and to a vice, really the defects of a virtue, prevalent in all classes of Americans which makes them prefer ingenuity to experience. Time was probably lost in experimentation which should either have taken place during the period of neutrality or been omitted altogether. One gathers a very definite impression that somehow the experience of the Allies was not digested soon enough, and this was costly in time and therefore in lives. None of this bears on Pershing who throughout has been a general in the field, except to bring into still stronger relief the high ability which he displayed. Through him the American part in the war was brought to its focus on the western front.

On him the exultation is now focused. It is meant not only for Pershing but for a multitude of whom he is not only a most engaging representative, but in every sense a leader. It should extend to Baker who picked him and sustained him and helped to temper him, to the fierce energies of March, to the finely dependable Bliss, to the responsible and ingenious Crowder. That it extends to the combat troops above all others needs hardly to be said.

Establishing a Precedent

POLITICS sometimes seem like an unending series of Hobson's choices. If you take what is called a liberal line, you may find yourself playing more or less the same game as Senator Reed or Mr. Hearst. If you take a conservative attitude you may become indistinguishable from Mr. Ochs. Providing such things matter, you won't

Copyright of New Republic is the property of New Republic and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.